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The employee stakeholder has a small voice when merger or 
acquisition decisions are being made. This paper illuminates the 
human element hidden within the Merger and Acquisition 
process.  The paper reviews workplace concepts such as trust, 
change leadership, communication, and employee resistance. 
Keywords: Managing people, mergers, acquisitions, change, 
workplace trust, organizational culture. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The process to merge two companies, or for one company to 
acquire another, offers management researchers an opportunity 
to discuss the impact on the human asset within this transaction. 
It is understood that organizational leaders that buy, sell, or 
merge companies, do so with the intention of improving the 
economic position of its principals (Schuler & Jackson 2001). 
Yet there are stakeholders that are negatively affected by a 
change in leadership due to a merger or acquisition (Buono & 
Bowditch 1989). How a company is assumed or acquired may 
have a positive impact on shareholders, but a negative impact on 
employees (Mackenzie, Penniman, & Woodsworth 2013). The 
opinions vary on whether a merger is desirable primarily 
because the financial benefits outweigh the costs (Auerbach 
1988). Can a true value be calculated without considering the 
role of employees’ knowledge and talent? Though it has been 
suggested that “…corporate empire builders have increasingly 
placed their faith in organizational growth through merger and 
acquisition,” firms overestimate the potential economic benefit 
as well as the ease of combining organizations so that the 
resulting structure can be successful (Buono & Bowditch, 1989, 
7).  The discussion of people vs. process, as relates to mergers 
and acquisitions, is the focus of this conference paper and 
discussion. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Research findings on companies that are led by their founders 
reflect stronger and more stable corporate cultures (Fauchart & 
Gruber 2011). Acquisitions, or even a shift from being privately 
to publicly held, can change the leadership focus, moving the 
organizational mission away from the employees tightly held 
assumptions and beliefs; thereby damaging the intangible assets 
of the target business. Post-merger integration is essential, yet 
may focus solely on process, and not on the people.  Poorly 
executed post-merger integration has been cited as a cause for 
acquisitions ending up as divestitures within two years (Buono 
& Bowditch 1989).  
 
Corporate culture is a primary variable underlying the success or 
failure in a merger. It is comprised of layers starting at the 
explicit and observable artifacts such as banners, stories, and 
promotional processes, and moving deeper to less explicit levels 
such as values (Buono, Bowditch & Lewis 1985).  Corporate 
culture is a pervasive influence on organizations and can 
increase or decrease the value of an organization, no different 
than other intangible assets, such as company reputation, 
customer loyalty, and analyst confidence. 
 
Trust, fear, and security therefore become relevant topics when 
discussing lessons learned from the outcomes of mergers or 
acquisitions. These human conditions are tightly tied to the 
influence of change upon the culture.  Change management 
literature offers a context within which we can better understand 




If management is resistant to being acquired, then the 
purchasers may take the path toward a hostile take-over.  As a 
result, the acquiring firm may go directly to the stockholders via 
a public tender offer.  This public awareness may cause other 
suitors to enter the market, thereby increasing the activity and 
the offered price.  But, if the acquiring company threatens to 
replace the acquired company’s managers, these individuals 
may further resist, regardless of whether the stockholders will 
benefit (Ruback 1988; Shleifer & Vishny 1988).  
 
The managers of the target firm may attempt to buy their own 
company and take it private. A management buy-out (MBO) is a 
form of acquisition; the managers borrow the money by inviting 
the participation of investment bankers to partner with them to 
buy the publicly held stock of their company. The outcome 
appears financially beneficial to stockholders, who earn a 
premium price on their stock; managers, who gain a larger 
equity stake in their company and retain their roles; and, 
investment bankers who gain both fees and a high return on 
their investments (Shleifer & Vishny 1988). And though 
managers may retain their position, they are often left with large 
debt payments owed to their investment banker colleagues 
(Mackenzie et al. 2013).  The MBO restructuring "give 
managers greater incentives to cut costs and to budget capital 
more responsibly" (Shleifer & Vishny 1988, 101).  This may 
lead managers to take action upon the company in the form of 
asset sales, layoffs or unprofitable operation shut-downs.  The 
new pressure to gain efficiencies benefit the organization with a 
renewed profitability focus, but the security bestowed on the 
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managers may result in less job-security on the non-
management employees. This leads to the discussion and 




A corporate merger or acquisition often requires company 
processes to be revised, communication to span company 
boundaries, and unfamiliar groups of employees to cooperate 
with management. The events related to a merger or an 
acquisition may have a profound impact on the people who 
spend their working lives in these organizations.  Research has 
revealed that the impact of the merger or acquisition is often 
negative. Employees “watch co-workers get laid off, their career 
paths and aspirations evaporate, their cynicism increase, and 
their faith in their leadership diminish” (Marks 1994, vii).  
 
Employee trust in leadership is closely tied to workplace health 
(Mackenzie 2010). Helliwell (2008) suggested that employees’ 
trust in their coworkers and their managers is among the chief 
workplace factors that influence life satisfaction.  A loss of trust 
will interfere with the optimization of the employees’ talents 
(Mackenzie 2010). This can lead to the erosion of work 
performance, increases in turnover, and a reduction in 
subordinate support for managers (Merriman, Schmidt, Ross, & 
Dunlap-Hinkler 2004, 13). Jacobs (2008, 53) recognized that 
lost trust is difficult to regain.  Productivity, morale, quality and 
the organizational culture can be hurt if managers fail to 
recognize that their workplace behaviors can damage their 
employees trust in them. (Merriman et al. 2007; Merriman et al. 
2004).  
 
Faith and trust influence the relationships among individuals 
and groups (Martins 2002; Helliwell 2008).  Trust is necessary 
for individuals to effectively transfer knowledge. A significant 
influence upon the workplace relationship is the trust in the 
leader (Ballinger & Schoorman 2007).  Sadly, “senior 
executives generally score low on employee trust” (Krell 2006, 
59).  
 
Managers in a fast moving and quickly changing workplace 
environment, which is the case with a corporate acquisition or 
merger, need to have employees trust in their ability and 
direction (Lufkin 2006).  An essential lesson is that “trust takes 
a long time to build, it can be easily destroyed, and is hard to 
regain.  Also, since breaking trust gives rise to distrust, 
maintaining trust requires careful attention from management” 
(Martins 2002, 754; Mackenzie 2010). 
 
Employee Resistance to Change and the Leaders’ Role 
 
The social identity of the employee with the workplace allows 
the employee to understand his or her role and to function 
effectively (Fauchart & Gruber 2011). Employees will reject, 
interpret, and even distort information based on these beliefs 
and mental models. Anger and insecurity can emerge when 
these models and symbols are altered without proper 
justification (Marks 1994, 34; Deal & Kennedy 2000, 157). 
Organizational change within a healthy work environment is 
viewed as “a path to a known state: something discreet, with 
orderly, incremental and continuous steps … It may cause some 
disruptions and require some adaptations, but its discrete nature 
allows people to know exactly what to expect and lets them get 
on with their lives inside and outside the organization” (Marks 
1994, 17). A transition “is a path to an unknown state … 
transition poses a break from the past … adapting to transition is 
much more psychologically taxing than is adapting to change” 
(Marks 1994, 18). Clearly, this is the situation with either a 
merger or an acquisition.   
 
A merger or acquisition involves stakeholders, whom will 
respond differently to the transition required of a merger. An 
external stakeholder with solely economic ties, such as a 
shareholder, may never experience the psychological stress of 
the transition. Yet, internal employee stakeholders will bring 
their “personal needs to the organization in which they work” 
(Carson 1999).   For many workers, including lower-level 
managers, “change is neither sought after nor welcomed. 
[Rather] it is disruptive and intrusive” (Strebel 1996).  And, 
unfortunately, employees tend to view change with suspicion 
and negativity, until they are prepared to think otherwise 
(Conner 1993). The employee stakeholder is most directly 
influenced because “the merger is a source of high uncertainty 
and reduced job security,” which may damage the economic 
value of the merger because of the employee’s resistance 
(Fitzgibbon & Seeger 2002, 47). When two companies merge, 
“radically innovative change” may be especially intimidating to 
long-term employees and will lead to the greatest resistance 
(Carson 1999).  
 
After a merger or acquisition the communication style of leaders 
must help employees revise their mental models so that 
changing products, processes and practices are accepted as good 
and necessary.  Employees need security to permit predictability 
to reenter their workplace lives (Vlamis 1999, 14-15). Only 
then, if successful, will the culture adapt (Deal & Kennedy 
2000, 158).  If possible, employees’ should be actively involved 
in the change process (Kim & Mauborgne 2003, 128).  If change 
occurs without any frontline employee involvement, they will 
judge their managers more severely (Strebel 1996).  If leaders 
are not able to persuasively espouse and support an explanatory 
vision for the transition, then “the force of the old culture can 
neutralize and emasculate a proposed change” (Deal & Kennedy 
2000, 158) with strategically valuable decisions being 
undermined (Woodward & Hendry 2004, 159).  
 
3 THE CASE OF BENQ-SIEMENS 
 
The case of BenQ’s acquisition of Germany’s Siemens mobile 
phone division illustrates a failure that is attributed to both 
communication and culture (Cheng & Seeger 2012). The 
acquisition created the fourth largest mobile phone brand, 
BenQ-Siemens. After losing 500 million Euros, Taiwan-based 
BenQ sought bankruptcy protection one year after the 
acquisition. Culture and communication are intimately 
connected, yet these organizations did not sufficiently consider 
these variables.  Substantially different in their cultural roots, 
one represented the Oriental Confucian culture, which values 
tradition, perseverance, and social obligations (Hofstede 1994) 
 
Northeast Business & Economics Association Proceedings, 2013 Page 150 
and the other the Germanic European culture, strongly focused 
on a strong work ethic leaning to the engineering viewpoint 
(Cheng and Seeger 2012, 120; Hofstede 1994, 12). BenQ is of a 
collective culture and Siemens of a highly individualistic 
culture. Another influential cultural difference is how the 
employees view their relationship to their superiors.  The Asian 
culture has a very high power distance, respectful and obedient, 
whereas the German culture is lower in the power distance 
dimension, viewing the manager role as equal to the worker 
(Hofstede  1994). 
 
A key factor cited in the failure of this acquisition was the 
management decisions emerging from the collectivist 
Taiwanese culture. With a view toward maintaining harmony, 
the BenQ chairman retained the Siemens division executive 
leader, Clemens Joos, along with 2800 research employees, 
believing that the result would be a cooperative and smooth 
transition (Cheng & Seeger 2012, 120); but the BenQ chairman 
realized his mistake in not replacing the leadership after the 
acquisition, which would have allowed for a rapid, less 
obstructed restructuring. The German individualist culture 
places the workers’ families over the collective good of the 
workplace community and organizational goals.  Also, the role 
of leadership as perceived by BenQ, with a strong respect for 
the authority of management, was not consistent with the 
German culture, where labor unions are strong, vacations are 
plentiful, and no one works on the weekend.  BenQ’s need to 
heavily cooperate with labor unions was an unplanned bump in 
a much damaged road. 
 
Fear and suspicion clouded the merger and caused the Siemens 
workers to distrust their new leaders viewing them as 
incompetent; totally unprepared to assume their role in the 
German market. Additionally, the Siemens workers felt that the 
German executives had betrayed them, knowing that BenQ 
could not save the division. The workers accused the German 
executives of abandoning them to avoid the traditionally large 
payoffs expected by workers when jobs are lost (Cheng and 
Seeger 2012).  Furthermore, the weak communication from the 
German leaders in the early stages of the acquisition, leading to 
the transition to BenQ, created severe uncertainty and distrust, 
stress and turnover.  BenQ, having the greater reason to comfort 
the employees, did little to establish strong internal 
communication processes that may have reduced the fear and 
uncertainty. Post-acquisition new business strategies were being 
introduced with the intent of rescuing the company; but, 
communication was confusing and inconsistent. “The 
organization should never have assumed that the employees 
would understand why these transitions and changes were 
taking place. Poor communication only confuses employees and 
undermines top-down implementation” (Cheng & Seeger 2012, 
123). 
 
As failure became inevitable, the collective culture to avoid 
shame, not for oneself, but for the group, led BenQ’s senior 
leader to take full public responsibility for the failure, 
intentionally preserving the reputation of others. “Thus, with 
respect to Lee’s long-term leadership, directors at BenQ rejected 
Chairman Lee’s resignation” (Cheng & Seeger 2012, 125). This 
case provides value lessons pertaining to communication before, 
during and after an acquisition as well as the severe, at times 
unseen, influence of cultural differences. 
 
4 THE CASE OF DAIMLER-CHRYSLER AG 
 
The second case, which illustrates the intent of leadership to 
effectively optimize communication before, after and during a 
merger, is that of Chrysler Corp. in its merger with Daimler 
Benz. The failure provides a lesson that employees require an 
alignment in the cultural artifacts; what is espoused must also be 
enacted. The espoused values will be tested as leaders' behaviors 
reflect their true intent.  
 
Chrysler Corporation and Daimler Benz appeared to be a merger 
of equals; they produce similar products within the same 
industry and are of similar size. The announcement of the 
merger in May 1998 communicated a collaboration that would 
result in an organization, Daimler-Chrysler AG, with a "truly 
global reach" (Fitzgibbon & Seeger 2002, 47). It was only a few 
years earlier in 1993 that had the Chrysler CEO, Robert Eaton, 
articulating the desire for the company to "stay healthy" and 
focus on "nuts and bolts" management. He stated that he would 
be the first chairman to "never lead a Chrysler comeback" 
(Marks 1994, 209). Yet, it was Robert Eaton who partnered with 
Daimler chief executive, Jurgen Schrempp, on the "explanatory 
and justificatory discourse ... directed to external audiences, 
primary shareholders, internal audiences, employees as well as 
dealers ... designed to primarily overcome resistance to the 
creation of this new global corporation" (Fitzgibbon & Seeger 
2002, 40). But a year after the merger the Chrysler group 
revealed a drop in both sales and market share. Prior to the 
merger Chrysler held 16.1% of the American auto industry 
reporting a 20% sales increase over prior year. The year later 
revealed a drop of 4% in sales and a market share of 15%.  Two 
years post-merger showed a further reduced market share of 
13.6%.  January 2001 had Daimler-Chrysler AG announcing an 
elimination of 26,000 jobs in its Chrysler group along with a 
major restructuring (Fitzgibbon & Seeger 2002).  So, what 
happened, and what can be learned? 
 
As in the BenQ-Siemens case, the influence of culture was 
under estimated.  Both companies' communication content had 
to reduce the doubt that major stakeholders had in this merger; 
each stating that the ability to gain a global presence would not 
have been realized without this merger. The sequence of public 
awareness for the merger started on May 5th with "leaked news 
of the potential Daimler Benz-Chrysler merger," followed by a 
Chrysler Corp. released statement on May 6th confirming that 
discussions were taking place, and an announcement of the 
merger in London on May 7th 1998 (Fitzgibbon & Seeger 2002, 
44). To manage the doubt, three communication speaking points 
were established and frequently repeated: (1) the companies 
formed a perfect fit due to the complementary strengths, no 
overlap, and common cultural mission. (2) The creation of a 
global entity as the result of economies of scale, yet the 
retention of each company’s markets and unique brands.  (3) A 
voluntary marriage of equals, which reinforced that "Chrysler 
would be allowed to maintain its uniqueness" even though the 
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new entity would be incorporated in Germany (Fitzgibbon & 
Seeger 2002, 49). 
 
The outcome that these communicated metaphors were not 
grounded in reality, led the merger to failure. Chrysler's culture 
was one of transparency with stakeholders strongly embedded in 
its transformation following it historic bailout and near 
bankruptcy. Americans took pride in Chrysler’s recovery, many 
feeling that they took part in saving this company by 
intentionally buying its products. Labor and leadership had an 
exceptional relationship with the president of the United Auto 
Workers Union sitting on its board, and employees 
remembering the sacrifices made with pride, to save their 
company. The Americanization aura that surrounded Chrysler 
emerged from Iacocca's advocating for limiting Japanese 
imports in favor of the patriotic path of buying a US made car. 
Even the Jewish community favored Chrysler over Ford due to 
Ford's alignment with Germany during the war. Now, with their 
company not only collaborating, but incorporating in Germany, 
these cultural beliefs were being damaged. The marriage of 
equals’ metaphor, though constantly reinforced in both sets of 
leaders' communications, was not believable, especially "as top 
Chrysler management left the company" and the marriage 
metaphor was reframed by employees with a less than positive 
interpretation (Fitzgibbon & Seeger 2002, 50). 
 
What happened? External discourse, once tested, failed to align 
with real decisions. For example, the Chrysler PR department 
was restructured so "all communication post-merger had to be 
cleared through Stuttgart, Germany," making Chrysler US 
clearly subordinate to Germany’s Daimler Benz (Fitzgibbon & 
Seeger 2002, 52). The elimination of 26,000 US jobs on January 
2001 changed Chrysler group from an equal partner to a 
subordinate business unit under the larger German based 
organization. The confusion and lack of confidence in the 
"marriage of equals" was an influencing factor in the stock value 
drop from the new entity's initial value of $70 to the $48 value 
early in 2001.  
 
The intentions of both firms were sincere, but the severe cultural 
differences could not be resolved once the strategic path did not 
align with the communicated metaphors. "In many instances, the 
initial metaphors were increasingly inconsistent with the 




Following the merger or acquisition, leadership must embrace 
the reasons to help the survivors recover (Harrison-Walker 
2008), but self-talk that may include sentiments such as, “it’s a 
lousy economy out there, aren’t people glad to have a job?” or 
“Aren’t there others waiting in line for their jobs,” or “people 
don’t want to look to the future, rather dwell on the past,” and 
finally “haven’t people always dealt with change and transition 
in organizations?” (Marks 1994, 22-24).  These rationalizing 
beliefs about the solely economic relationship between 
employees and employers neglect the human element that 
makes an organizational culture healthy and optimizes 
performance.  Schuler and Jackson (2001) provide a roadmap to 
help employees return to normalcy.  These take place first at the 
company level with a clear vision of the post-merger 
organization and the predictability of the integration strategies. 
Also, the role of Human Resources must be prominent with 
problems handled quickly and sensitively, recognizing that 
“unmanaged cultural differences will lead to 
miscommunications and misunderstandings” (Schuler & 
Jackson 2001, 251).  Relevant to understanding communication 
is Johlke et al.’s research (2000), which revealed the difference 
between informal and formal communication styles; employees 
need both. Therefore, an essential lesson is that senior leaders as 
well as frontline managers must select the appropriate 
communication style, based on the situation, to ensure that an 
employee feels connected to the organization, his or her 
manager, and the other team members (Solomon 2001, 60). 
“The objective of organizational revitalization is not merely to 
recover from transition, but to rebound with a workforce that 





This conference paper is a derivative motivated by a 
collaborative work on mergers and acquisitions and the lessons 
that can be learned by not-for-profit organizations.  I value the 
inspiration of my co-authors Drs. Penniman and Woodsworth. 
Not-for-profit cultures, the information industry, organizational 
theory, and managing in the for-profit sector, were effectively 
combined within this broader collaborative work. I strongly 
encourage those who are interested to the review this broader 
chapter:  Mackenzie, M.L., Penniman, W.D., & Woodsworth, 
A. Lessons from the corporate world. (2013). In A. Woodsworth 
& W.D. Penniman (Eds.), Mergers, alliances, collaborations 
and partnerships: Advances in Librarianship (pp. 27-58, Vol. 
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